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Economists note that the spectrum allocation system rigidly over–protects the 
airwaves, and that liberalization could significantly reduce barriers to entry for new 
competitors and innovative wireless technologies. This paper applies this policy insight, 
demonstrating that market mechanisms can be used to salvage the digital TV transition. 
 
Year–end 2006 is scheduled as the date when 1,500 TV stations cease analog 
broadcasts, continuing in digital format only. Yet, according to a safeguard provision, 
analog stations will remain in any TV market where fewer than 85 percent of households 
are equipped to receive digital transmissions over–the–air. Of 33 million TV sets sold in 
the U.S. in 2000, just 37,000 (0.1 percent) possessed digital reception functionality. This 
lack of customer interest, combined with the 85% trigger, assures substantial delays. 
 
Ironically, a parallel transition to digital TV proceeds spontaneously.  About 35% 
of U.S. TV households subscribe to digital cable or digital satellite service; this level is 
projected to double by 2006. Subscription TV viewers use set–top converters to translate 
analog or digital signals for either analog or digital TV sets; the technology transition is 
inexpensive and seamless to customers. 
 
More broadly, the success of subscription TV service is reducing the TV Band to 
irrelevance. At year–end 2001, 87% of U.S. households will receive their television by 
wire or satellite link, a proportion expected to grow to 91% in 2004. At that point, fewer 
than ten million U.S. households will rely on over–the–air TV. If something less than $3 
billion is invested to move remaining over–the–air TV viewers to a “limited basic” cable 
or satellite TV service, substantial social gains result.  
 
First, consumers avoid expenditures for new digital TV receivers, saving 50––150 
billion dollars. Second, the 402 MHz of prime radio spectrum now allocated to over–the–
air TV broadcasting could provide alternative uses (such as mobile telephony or high–
speed Internet access) worth 50––470 billion dollars. Public interest considerations also 
strongly recommend a migration of broadcast TV to subscription services. As the 
opportunity costs of a spectrum allocation originally conceived in 1939 have grown 
enormous, gains from allowing market reallocation are commensurate.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              1 
 
The U.S. Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte Switch 
Thomas W. Hazlett 
 
I.  The Over–the–Air Digital TV Transition 
 
To say that the transition to digital television in the United States is not going well 
is a bit like saying that Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika is falling somewhat behind 
schedule. While rules codified by Congress in 1997
1 set December 31, 2006 as the date 
when 1,500 analog TV stations will go dark (with an identical number of broadcast 
stations continuing to transmit in digital format), delays are virtually certain. According 
to a safeguard provision, analog stations will remain in any TV market where fewer than 
85 percent of households are equipped to receive digital transmissions over–the–air 
(OTA).
2 Yet, of 33 million TV sets sold in the U.S. in 2000, just 37,000 (0.1 percent) 
possessed digital OTA reception functionality.
3 This lack of consumer interest,
4 
combined with the 85% trigger before a market transition in each TV market, make it 
highly unlikely that the OTA analog to digital television transition will take place as 
planned. 
Comparing the digital TV transition to perestroika is not gratuitous. The central 
planning at the heart of the spectrum allocation system leads the U.S. government, 
through the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to structure wireless 
services top–down. This system is relatively unresponsive to consumer demand and a 
barrier to entry for new technologies. The consensus among policy economists is for 
reforms allowing market allocation of bandwidth. In a February 2001 Comment filed 
with the FCC, 37 economists with expertise in telecommunications and public policy 
                                                 
1   Communications Act of 1934, as amended, §309(j)(14).  The digital television transition rules were 
codified in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
2   The ability to receive digital signals via cable or satellite connections does not count toward the 85% 
requirement unless the subscription services provide all analog and digital TV signals offered in the local 
market.  Neither cable nor satellite operators do offer such, as it would consume large quantities of 
bandwidth with redundant programming of only trivial value to customers.  See discussion below. 
3   Christopher Stern, Mixed Signals, Broadcasters’ Promise of a Digital TV Age has Not Been Met, And 
Now Congress Is Having Second Thoughts About Its Role, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2000), H1. 
4   The level of sales is, of course, influenced by both demand and supply factors.  The incremental cost of 
DTV reception capability is discussed below.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2 
 
urged regulators to relax rules such that operators can use spectrum flexibly and new 
competitors can expeditiously gain access to idle bandwidth.
5 
This paper demonstrates how to implement such reform in the TV Band, 
frequencies of potentially high social value but vastly under–utilized due to regulatory 
constraints. Market mechanisms can be used to salvage the transition from analog TV 
broadcasting by facilitating the spontaneous migration to digital cable and satellite 
service well underway without subsidies or mandates.  
 
II.  The TV Band  
 
  The television band currently consumes 402 MHz of radio spectrum. See Figure 
1. The allocation spans the VHF and UHF bands, and consists of 67 channels with 6 MHz 
allocated to each. The spectrum was allocated to television broadcasting by the Federal 
Communications Commission between 1939 and 1953. The UHF television allocation 
originally occupied fourteen additional channels (70–83), but these frequencies were 
reallocated to land mobile radio service (and other uses) in a rule making initiated in 
1968.  
In ongoing proceedings, the FCC is attempting to reallocate some TV Band 
frequencies. Such changes are mired in regulatory process. An auction for licenses that 
would allocate 30 MHz of the 60–69 channel spectrum has been postponed five times as 
of this writing.
6 Prospective allocation changes are subordinated to completion of the 
over–the–air digital TV transition.
7 Hence, the TV Band consumes 402 MHz of radio 
                                                 
5   “Comments of Thirty–Seven Concerned Economists,” Federal Communications Commission, In the 
Matter of Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary 
Markets, WT Docket No. 00–230 (Feb. 7, 2001).  The list of signatories:  Martin Neil Baily, Jonathan 
Baker, Timothy Bresnahan, Ronald Coase, Peter Cramton,  Robert W. Crandall, Richard Gilbert, Shane 
Greenstein, Robert W. Hahn, Robert Hall, Barry Harris, Robert Harris, Jerry A. Hausman, Thomas W. 
Hazlett, Andrew Joskow, Alfred E.  Kahn, Michael Katz,  Robert E. Litan, Paul Milgrom,  Roger G. Noll, 
Janusz Ordover, Bruce Owen, Michael Riordan, William Rogerson, Gregory Rosston, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
David Salant, Richard L. Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, Howard Shelanski, J. Gregory Sidak, Pablo 
Spiller, David Teece, Michael Topper, Hal Varian, Leonard Waverman and Lawrence J. White.  See: 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/related/fcc.pdf. 
6   See: Appendix 2.  Currently, the auction is delayed indefinitely.  Federal Communications Commission, 
Public Notice DA 01–1546, "AUCTION OF LICENSES FOR THE 747–762 AND 777–792 MHz BANDS 
(Auction #31) Is POSTPONED" (July 11, 2001).  See also:  Thomas W. Hazlett, “Hostage Stand–off,” 
Barron's (March 19, 2001). 
7   The FCC plan for transitioning to digital television envisions a reduction in the aggregate amount of 
spectrum allocated to OTA TV broadcasting.  Originally, some 138 MHz of the TV Band (34 percent) was                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3 
 
spectrum today and will likely occupy something close to this for the foreseeable future. 
 




Channels  2–4    5–6    7–13    14–36    38–69   
                     
                     
  MHz      54       72 76      88 174               216 470                       608 614                            806 
 
When 




The television band hosts relatively little communications traffic. There are 
currently 1,472 full–power TV broadcast stations in the United States, distributed across 
210 TV viewing markets.
9 This implies an average of seven TV stations per market. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be reallocated at a future date; this was then revised downward to 108 MHz.  In December 1997, 24 
MHz was reallocated from channels 60–69 to public safety services pending successful completion of the 
digital television transition.  In Feb. 2001, the Commission did auction “guard band” licenses allocated 6 
MHz of the spectrum allocated to 60–69.  The severe restrictions placed on the licenses, over–protecting 
adjacent users, effectively reduced their value; just under $21 million was bid for nationwide licenses.  See:  
Gregory L. Rosston,  Overlay Rights: The Guard Band Experience, AEI–Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies Conference, “Practical Steps to Spectrum Markets” (Nov. 9, 2001); FCC, 700 MHz 
Guard Band Auction 38 Fact Sheet, http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions/auc38/ auc38fct.html (visited Aug. 
30, 2001).  Of course, the analysis in this paper can be straightforwardly adjusted to reflect whatever TV 
Band reallocations do occur. 
8   Sources.  Present allocation: Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Where Do We Go From Here? The 
FCC Auctions and the Future of Radio Spectrum Management (April 1997) [“CBO 1997”], 46.  Allocation 
channels 2 –13:  Stern, Robert H.  The Federal Communications Commission and Television. The 
Regulatory Process in an Environment of Rapid Technical Innovation. New York: Arno Press (1979). 186, 
266–70.   Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order: In the Matter of Amendments to the 
Commission’s Rules and regulations Governing Sharing of Television Channels and Assignment of 
Frequencies to Television and Non–government Fixed and Mobile Services. Docket No. 8487, May 5, 
1948.  Allocation channels 14–69:  Noll, Roger G; Peck, Merton J; McGowan, John J. Economics Aspects 
of Television Regulation. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution (1973). 3–4. 
9   This count excludes low–power TV stations, cable stations (channels on cable systems used to distribute 
broadcast network programs in lieu of a local broadcast affiliate), and foreign TV stations broadcasting into 
U.S. television markets.  See Appendix 1.  TV station counts of 1600 or more are often used, apparently 
including such entities. 
VHF  UHF                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 4 
 
Because large markets tend to have more stations, the household–weighted average is 
somewhat larger––about 13 stations
10––but the number remains a small fraction of band 
capacity.
11 Of the 67 channels reserved for television, under 11 percent deliver broadcast 
programming in the average U.S. city; under twenty percent in the average U.S. 
(population–adjusted) TV market; and just 34% in the most crowded local TV market 
(Los Angeles). See Table 1 (and Appendix 1).  
 
 
TABLE 1. TV BAND UTILIZATION IN U.S. TV MARKETS 
 
Area       Description         Total Stations     Stations/Mkt     Utilization Rate 
 
TV Markets 1–210  All U.S. markets  1,472    7.0    10.5% 
 
TV Markets 1–210  All U.S. markets,  
population–weighted  1,472    13.0    19.4% 
             
Los Angeles    TV Market with  23    23    34.3% 
      most stations 
 
   
                                                 
10   Congressional Budget Office, Completing the Transition to Digital Television (Sept. 1999) [“CBO 
1999”], I–3. 
11   The official explanation for the current allocation is that buffers (or “taboo” channels) are needed to 
separate TV broadcasts, else harmful interference would result.  This has never been a satisfying 
explanation, in that the location, power, and transmitter standards chosen for television by the FCC visibly 
reduced band utilization (and consumer choice) even in the earliest days of TV broadcasting.  This resulted 
in the 1955 exit of the DuMont network, decades of struggle for UHF stations “inter–mixed” with more 
powerful VHF outlets, and Commission policies in the 1960s and 1970s to suppress the medium that 
offered to enhance consumer choice (cable television).  Moreover, by mandating transmission technologies 
as established by the National Television Standards Committee a half–century ago, regulation has imposed 
spectrally inefficient separation rules. Utilization levels as calculated are substantially inflated by the use of 
obsolete picture and transmission formats; the same level of program choice could today be delivered via 
much reduced bandwidth.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 5 
 
On April 3, 1997 the FCC awarded each existing (analog) TV station a second 
license to deliver digital television (DTV) broadcasts.
12 According to the Commission’s 
timetable, stations will broadcast their programming in digital format by 2003, and 
viewers will be given until Dec. 31, 2006 to purchase TV sets (or decoders) capable of 
over–the–air DTV reception. At that time, existing analog stations are scheduled to go 
dark, with DTV broadcasts taking their place––wherever at least 85 percent of local 
households own over–the–air DTV receivers.  
This condition is virtually certain to block the DTV transition. As of August 2001, 
just 150,003 units had been sold capable of receiving DTV signals OTA.
13 With 102 
million U.S. TV households, no more than 0.15% of American families are able to 
receive OTA digital signals.
14 
   
 
 
TABLE 2. PRICES FOR OVER–THE–AIR DIGITAL TV  
RECEIVERS (STAND–ALONE MODELS) 
 
Make  Model  Description  Source  Price 
RCA  DTC100  High Definition Digital Receiver  www.rca.com  $549.00 
Samsung  SIR–T150X  Digital TV Tuner  www.walmart.com  $599.91 
Mitsubishi  SRHD400  HDTV Receiver  www.tweeter.com  $799.99 
Panasonic  TU–HDS20  HDTV Digital Receiver  www.panasonic.com  $899.95 
Mean Receiver Price  $712.21 




                                                 
12   Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact 
Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service in Docket No. 87–268, 12 FCC Rcd 12809 (1997). 
13   This includes stand–alone receivers and units integrated into television sets, as reported by the 
Consumer Electronics Association.   Michael Grotticelli and Karen Anderson Prikos, Special Report: DTV 
Dog Days, BROADCASTING & CABLE (August 20, 2001), 28. 
14   Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Television Financial Factbook 2000 [“Kagan 2000”], 10.  This assumes 
just one DTV unit per household, producing the maximum penetration rate.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 6 
 
 
TABLE 3. PRICES FOR COMPARABLE TV SETS 
WITH AND WITHOUT DIGITAL CAPABILITIES 
 
Make  Model  Description  Size  Price 
RCA  F36668  Stereo TV  36"  $949.00 
RCA  MM36100*  Stereo Digital High Resolution Monitor–Receiver  36" 
$1,899.0
0 
RCA  F38310**  Digital High–Definition Monitor–Receiver  38" 
$3,499.0
0 
RCA  P61926  Home Theater Series with Guide+ Gold  61" 
$1,999.0
0 
RCA  MM61110* 
Digital High–Resolution Projection Monitor–
Receiver  61" 
$2,999.0
0 
RCA  P61300**  High Definition Monitor–Receiver  61" 
$3,999.0
0 
Sony  KV–35S66  Trinitron Stereo Color TV  35" 
$1,099.9
9 
Sony  KV–36HS20*  FD Trinitron WEGA TV  36" 
$2,299.9
9 
Sony  KW–34HD1**  FD Trinitron Digital TV  34" 
$7,499.9
9 
Sony  KP–61V90  Big Screen Projection TV  61" 
$2,199.0
0 
Sony  KP–61HS10*  Hi–Scan 1080i HDTV Projection TV  61"  
$3,099.0
0 
Sony  KWP–65HD**  Widescreen Big Screen HDTV  65" 
$9,999.9
9 
Sources: www.rca.com; www.sony.com. 
*  Capable of displaying digital video. 
** Capable of receiving an over–the–air digital signal and displaying it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 7 
 
There are three apparent reasons for this lack of consumer interest. First, the cost 
of OTA digital reception is high. Stand–alone units capable of receiving and translating 
over–the–air digital signals for digital TV sets average about $775. See Table  2. 
Upgrading both the television set (analog to digital) and purchasing a built–in receiver for 
over–the–air digital signals is even more expensive, ranging from about $1,000 to over 
$5,000 per unit. See Table 3.  
The second disincentive is that there is l ittle programming available in digital 
format that viewers cannot see (more cheaply) in analog. Just two hundred TV stations 
have begun digital broadcasting,
15 and most of these are providing little high–definition 
programming (it is not clear that this would be much of a draw). The content offered via 
digital transmission is generally about the same signal quality, and exactly the same 
content quality, as is available to analog viewers. 
Third, consumers are not particularly worried about analog TV sets becoming 
obsolete any time soon. Even experts on the subject do not take the 2006 “deadline” as 
realistic. Indeed, former Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain (R–AZ) 
has referred to it as “a joke from the beginning.”
16 
Digital broadcasting theoretically allows greater utilization of the TV Band by 
enabling less separation between stations in local markets, yet the planned digital TV 
transition promises to delay spectrum rationalization. With consumers refusing to invest 
in digital receivers, the existing allocation plan continues to crowd out productive 
exploitation of the TV Band.  
 
Video Services Migrating Out of the TV Band  
A small and diminishing minority of Americans receive their video programming 
via terrestrial broadcast signals. Nearly eighty–seven percent of U.S. TV households 
today receive their video programs from cable or satellite subscription services, 
                                                 
15    As of August 6, 2001, 202 stations broadcast digitally.  National Association of Broadcasters, Digital 
Television N ewsroom, “202 Stations delivering on digital.” 
http://www.nab.org/Newsroom/Issues/digitaltv/dtvstations.asp (visited Aug. 22, 2001). 
 
16   Christopher Stern, Digital Debate Gets Static in Senate Hearing, DAILY VARIETY (July 9, 
1998) (available at: http://www.c–span.org).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 8 
 
bypassing “free” over–the–air services for a richer array of higher–quality––and more 
expensive––signals. See Table 4.   
Factoring these utilization ratios together calculates an interesting statistic. Under 
twenty percent of allocated TV channels are utilized in the mean TV market (adjusted for 
population). Only 13% of households use over–the–air transmissions to receive these  
signals.
17 For 87% of households, the use of 402 MHz in the TV Band is redundant, and 
of little or no value.
18 Factoring in this dimension of airwave utilization yields a viewer–
                                                 
17   All cable subscribers, currently about 70% of U.S. TV households, receive all local TV signals.  This is 
mandated by the “must carry” provisions in the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act.   Pub. L. 102–385, 102  Stat 1460, codified in 47 USC §§ 534, 535 (1999).  The same 
basic pattern obtained prior to must carry rules, as even marginally popular local broadcast stations were 
carried voluntarily by cable television systems.  See Michael G. Vita and John P. Wiegand, Must–Carry 
Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Economic Policy Analysis, 37 J B ROAD & E LEC MEDIA 1 
(1993);  Michael G. Vita, Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 
J REG  ECON 159 (1997).  Among satellite TV subscribers, about 15% of TV households, local broadcast 
signals are currently offered (via satellite link) for $5–6 per month in the top forty U.S. markets.  The 
broadcast service offered typically includes just the top four local network affiliates (ABC, CBS, NBC and 
Fox), along with the national PBS channel.  About sixty percent of satellite TV customers in these markets 
take the package.  Statement of Eddy Hartenstein, Corporate Senior Vice President, Hughes Electronics 
Corp. (owner of DirecTV), before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Business Rights, and Competition (April 4, 2001).  Must carry rules for satellite TV carriers, scheduled to 
become effective Jan. 1, 2002, will soak up channel capacity, restricting broadcast TV channel carriage to 
just about the forty markets currently served, even with the advent of spectrum–economizing spot beam 
satellites.  These are scheduled for launch at year–end 2001, and designed to make five hundred or more 
channels available for local TV channel retransmission.  Satellite operators could utilize this capacity to 
extend their ‘Top 4 + PBS’ coverage to scores of additional markets if not for must carry r ules.  
Additionally, broadcast network signals could (given time to execute new network–affiliate agreements) be 
offered to households in very small markets in the absence of must carry.   (Households outside TV 
markets are already able to receive network broadcast programming via satellite.)  Both direct broadcast 
satellite (DBS) operators, EchoStar and DirecTV, are challenging satellite must carry rules in ongoing 
litigation (in which the author is an expert witness retained by plaintiffs).  See: Satellite Broadcasting & 
Communications Association v. Federal Communications Commission, et al, Case No. 00–1571–A (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 20, 2000).  The great majority of DBS subscribers either receive––or could receive –– over–the–
air TV signals via their DBS carrier at approximately zero marginal cost, facilitating the assumption that 
DBS subscribers (like cable TV subscribers) do not rely on terrestrial broadcasting.   
18   The National Association of Broadcasters claims that “81 million TV sets in America [of a total of 267 
million] receive programming exclusively from free, over–the–air television,” and that “25 percent of all 
cable and satellite homes have at least one TV set in the household that receives signals solely from free 
TV.”  NAB, Press Release (Aug. 7, 2001).   By not adjusting for usage, the figures clearly overstate the 
importance of over–the–air reception.  Because cable and satellite households pay, on average, over $500 
per year in subscription fees to upgrade their “free” television service, the receiver sets that are actually 
viewed tend to be connected to the multi–channel video provider.  Sets that are simply stored in a den or 
back room are, technically speaking, receiving “signals solely from free TV,” even as family members 
watch other sets wired to cable or satellite.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   9 
 
adjusted calculation revealing that just 2.5 percent
19 of the bandwidth allocated to over–
the–air TV signals is utilized to provide service to the public. 
 
 
TABLE 4. HOUSEHOLDS AND SUBSCRIBERS IN THE  
U.S. MULTI–CHANNEL VIDEO SUBSCRIPTION MARKET 
(YEAR–END PROJECTIONS BY PAUL KAGAN ASSOC.) 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
T.V. HHs (mil.)  102.0  103.0  104.0  104.9  105.9 
Cable TV Subs (mil.)  68.9  69.4  69.8  70.1  70.5 
DBS Subs (mil.)  19.5  22.2  24.0  25.0  25.7 













TV HHs w/o 











Digital Cable (mil.)  19.1  27.1  34.1  40.1  44.6 
Digital Cable+Sat. 
(mil.) 
38.6  49.3  58.1  65.1  70.3 












Sources: Paul Kagan Assoc., Cable Television Financial Factbook 2000 [“Kagan 2000”], 
10; Paul Kagan Assoc., The State of DBS 2001 [“Kagan 2001”], 15.   
a. Assumes no cable/satellite subscriber cross–over. 
 
 
III.  Tossing the Negroponte Switch 
 
Whether he meant to or not, new FCC Chairman Michael Powell 
put the issue on the table at an April press conference, in which he 
addressed the implications for TV stations should cable and DBS attain 
                                                 
19   (TV Band Utilization Rate) * (Proportion of Households Receiving TV Over–the–Air) = (0.194 ) * (0 
.13) = 0.025.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 10 
 
near–universal penetration. “If 100 percent of Americans don't get free, 
over–the–air TV, what are we protecting?” Powell asked.
20 
 
While there are numerous problems associated with the transition to over–the–air 
digital television,
21 it is sufficient to note that consumers are refusing to buy digital 
television receivers. This factor alone assures that the 85% digital receiver penetration 
condition will not be met in any U.S. market by 2006. Moreover, for the condition to ever 
be met, federal law requiring digital reception for new television sets sold in the United 
States will be necessary. Even with such expensive rules in place, the 85% threshold 
penetration rate would not be achieved for many years.
22 The National Association of 
Broadcasters’ “accelerated” scenario, which includes implementation of dual must–carry 
(requiring cable systems to transmit, without charge to TV stations, analog and digital 
broadcast TV signals) and a federal law mandating all TV sets larger than 13” include 
OTA digital reception capability, sees 2010–12 as the transition date. In the absence of 
such policy interventions, the NAB forecasts 2020–2025 as the transition date.
23 
Ironically, while the market stubbornly resists digital OTA television, a parallel 
transition to digital TV technology proceeds rapidly. There are currently about 102 
million television households, of which nineteen million households will subscribe to 
digital cable service by year–end 2001, with 44.6 million subscribers projected by 2005.  
                                                 
20   Ted Hearn, Could TV Stations Lose Their Spectrum? MULTICHANNEL NEWS (June 18, 2001), 56. 
21   An intense intra–industry debate rages over whether the FCC’s digital TV standard will actually deliver 
quality signals to viewers.  “Facing angry opposition, nearly 300 of the nation's 1,600 television stations 
filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission on Friday, formally requesting a revision in 
the nation's digital–television standard that was approved almost three years ago.  Led by Sinclair 
Broadcasting ……the stations argue that the present technical standard is flawed because the digital 
receivers  now on the market cannot easily receive a viewable picture in anything short of ideal 
circumstances.  That problem "will likely lead to the failure of digital television in this country," David 
Smith, Sinclair's chairman, said in a satellite news conference …..  But a variety of manufacturers, retailers 
and network–television executives all say they vehemently oppose changing the standard."  Joel Brinkley, 
Stations Challenge Digital–TV Standard, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 11, 1999), C18.  See also:  Joel Brinkley, 
Broadcasters Seeks Change in Digital TV Format, NEW YORK TIMES (July 12, 1999), C1; Joel Brinkley, 
More Stations Back Revised DTV Standard, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 1, 1999), C14. 
22   The replacement rate of TV sets is about 13.5% annually, assuming a fixed stock of about 245 million 
sets.   If all new TV sets are equipped to receive OTA digital signals, then 85% penetration would occur in 
a little over six years.  
23   Joseph S. Kraemer and Richard O. Levine, Implications of the Adoption of Digital Must–Carry on the 
Speed of the Broadcast DTV Transition: A Scenario Analysis (June 11, 2001), study by the National 
Association of Broadcasters and the Law & Economics Consulting Group [“Kraemer & Levine 2001”], 3, 
14, 17.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 11 
 
DBS television programming––100% digital––will be received by some 19.5 million 
households at year–end 2001, with a projected subscribership of 25.7 million by 2005. 
See Table 4.   
These trends suggest that by 2006 there will be fewer than ten million U.S. 
households receiving video programming over–the–air; over ninety percent will 
subscribe to services where the digital/analog interface is contained in the set–top box, 
invisible to the viewer. Avoiding use of a digital TV receiver is a substantial advantage 
given today’s relative prices for equipment. Even at substantially lower prices for digital 
decoders, substantial social gains could be realized by allowing households to economize 
on investments in digital TV. 
Nicholas Negroponte speculated years ago that while we grew up in a world 
where telephone calls were made over wires and TV broadcasts were received over–the–
air, we were likely to exit a world where just the reverse obtained. George Gilder dubbed 
this the Negroponte Switch.
24 Today, the state of the competing digital TV transitions 
begs the question: Why not toss the Negroponte Switch in 2006––or before? This 
question has been raised by the current FCC Chairman, Michael Powell: “[I]t seems clear 
to me that at some point on the horizon, all Americans––perhaps in 10 years––will have 
pay–TV. As an entity, [over–the–air TV broadcasters] may and probably will be there but 
as a program supplying interest more than a distribution platform.”
25 Examination of the 
trade–offs suggests substantial net benefits are associated with policies allowing the 
digital TV transition to follow the market’s path of least resistance. 
 
What To Do 
The Negroponte Switch is already being thrown by millions of consumers 
abandoning “free, over–the–air TV” for fee–based services.
26 This allows policy makers 
to follow marketplace trends with measures to reinforce consumer demand. The goal is to 
allow market choices to undo the misallocation of spectrum in OTA television while 
eliminating the l arge household tax implicit in the FCC’s “Advanced Television” 
                                                 
24   Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (1996), 24. 
25   FCC’s Powell Sees Big Change in Broadcast Environment, 21 COMM DAILY (Oct. 23, 2001), 1–2. 
26   The average cable customer pays $48.41 per month in 2001; the average DBS customer pays $58.19.  
Kagan 2000, 10; Kagan 2001, 15.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  12 
 
proceeding that mandates individuals purchase new digital OTA receivers.
27 Both goals 
can be achieved by embracing the digital television transition now well underway in 




1.  Drop DTV broadcasting mandates for broadcast stations. Since unique 
programming is not available for DTV, and because no OTA reception is possible 
without expensive new consumer investments (investments consumers are refusing to 
make), further station expenditures should be purely voluntary.  Currently, only about 
200 television stations (13 percent of total full–power stations) broadcast in digital 
format.
29 The smaller stations yet to comply with DTV mandates should be spared the 
expense. 
 
2.  Invite competitive bids for plans to move OTA television households to 
subscription based services. Satellite, terrestrial wireless, broadcast and cable 
companies could individually or in collaboration submit proposals to identify, and 
serve, the ten million households that do not receive video programming via 
subscription service. These plans would state a price at which such households would 
be served broadcast TV signals by alternative delivery mechanisms, and would 
include a mechanism to phase out transitional subsidies.
30  
                                                 
27   It should also be noted that the OTA digital transition––if executed as planned––would likely leave 
millions of U.S. households without access to over–the–air TV broadcast signals.  Because analog TV 
stations would go dark in any market in which 85% of households were equipped with digital OTA 
reception capability, the implication is that up to 15% of local households would be unable to receive such 
signals.  This is a larger percentage of the population than the proportion that is today without subscription 
television service. 
28   A precursor to this proposal was floated in 1996.  “Sen. John Ashcroft (R–Mo.) is struggling to find a 
way to bring TV broadcasters into the digital age.  Rather than giving TV stations new spectrum, Ashcroft 
has proposed migrating TV stations to cable and selling off their current spectrum to the highest bidder. 
The Federal Communications Commission estimates the spectrum's value at between $20 billion and $132 
billion. Proceeds from the spectrum sale would go toward wiring every unserved home to cable. Former 
broadcasters would evidently become a new class of cable programmer afforded free access to cable 
systems. Many details of the plan remain murky, but Ashcroft's idea is designed to free up spectrum for 
mobile communications, which, in his view, are the highest and best use of a finite resource, while 
protecting broadcasting as a free service to all Americans.”  Ted Hearn, Sen. Mulls Migrating Broadcasters 
to Cable,  NEWS (July 1, 1996), 20.   
29   Supra, note 16.   
30   On efficiency grounds it appears the optimal subsidy is zero.  This result may also hold on equity 
grounds.  It is unclear if an entitlement to OTA television redistributes income from rich to poor, or––if it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 13 
 
 
3.  TV Band liberalization. When all television programming is distributed via 
subscription services, broadcasters would be free to re–deploy the spectrum allocated 
their TV licenses to other wireless telecommunications services.
31 Remaining TV 
Band spectrum would be exhaustively allocated to generic Wireless 
Telecommunications Licenses (WTLs). These licenses would grant users full 
flexibility in the non–interfering  use of TV Band frequencies. One possible plan 
would be to create five nationwide WTLs, each allocated one fifth of the available 
bandwidth (80.4 MHz). Existing TV station allotments would encumber the various 
bands, with overlay licensees operating as secondary rights holders. Incumbent TV 
stations would be free to contract with new WTL owners to move, combine, or sell.
32  
 
The Benefits of Doing It  
There are two quantifiable benefit streams associated with a digital television 
transition via subscription service (DTTVSS). Both are estimated to a first approximation 
here. The first is the avoided cost of new digital OTA receivers. By using the seamless 
transition to digital television offered by set–top boxes rented to TV subscribers, the 
consumer is relieved of having to buy new television sets capable of receiving digital 
signals OTA. The second is the creation of valuable wireless services once the TV Band 
is available to provide a mix of alternative wireless services including mobile telephone, 
fixed or mobile broadband access, digital television, satellite communications, among 
others. 
                                                                                                                                                 
does –– is a productive way to deliver benefits to recipient households. The United Kingdom charges for 
OTA television, with fees currently about $144 annually per household.  (Or £8 per month in 1999/2000.  
Survey to Determine the Consumers’ Surplus Accruing to TV Viewers and Radio Listeners: Final Report, 
Prepared for the Radiocommunications Agency [Oct. 2000], http://www.radio.gov.uk/, §1.3.2.)  The U.S. 
does not subsidize radio or television receiving equipment, even as the digital TV transition relies on 
substantial expenditures by households in new systems.   On the other hand, the government funds public 
broadcasting, a program service primarily consumed by relatively affluent households.   The principle 
argument for configuring a transition policy to include a subsidy is political expediency.  To craft a solution 
that will allow efficient use of the TV Band, first best solutions may prove ineffective relative to measures 
making each major constituency better off.  Gordon C. Rausser, Predatory Versus Productive Government: 
The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policies, 6 J ECON PERSP 133 (Summer 1992). 
31   Given complete spectrum flexibility, some over–the–air TV broadcasting could continue.  By 
compressing the TV Band into a small number of channels per market, broadcasters might successfully 
compete for spectrum.  See discussion below.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 14 
 
 
1.  Avoided DTV set costs. Currently, the cost of a stand alone digital over–the–air 
receiver averages over $700. See Table 2. Built–in units are typically priced much 
higher.  See Table 3. The cost of digital receivers is expected to fall with larger 
production runs, although estimates of where the incremental cost will settle are 
exceedingly speculative.
33 Given their similarity to reception devices used by direct 
broadcast satellite subscribers, which include digital set–top boxes and outdoor 
receiving components, assuming rough parity may be reasonable. DBS subscriber 
counts are now above 16 million, so scale economies are presumably being realized. 
Customer premises equipment is self–installed, on a stand–alone basis, for out–of–
pocket costs of about $200 and above. (See discussion below.) Using this lower 
bound, a simple aggregate estimate is possible. There are currently about 245 million 
television sets in U.S. households.
34 The total expense in replacing and/or retrofitting 
existing sets equals about $49 billion. Were digital receivers to stay priced as high as 
$600 per unit, replacement costs would equal $147 billion. These costs would be 
avoided were the DTTVSS to replace the current transition plan.
35  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
32   The overlay plan is similar to that proposed in 1996 by Sen. Larry Pressler (R–SD), then Senate 
Commerce Committee Chairman.  CONG. REC.––SEN. (May 9, 1996), S4928–36. 
33   The Department of Commerce opined in early 1996 that digital TV receivers would fall to just fifty 
dollars each, a view rejected by the Congressional Budget Office in 1999.  CBO 1999, 33. 
34   As of 2000, there were 244,990,000 operational TV sets in U.S. homes, or 2.43 per TV household.  
Television Bureau of Advertising, “Trends in Television: Television Sets”. 
http://www.tvb.org/tvfacts/index.html (visited Aug. 22, 2001).  The original source is Nielsen Media 
Research. 
35   While the current digital television plan does not mandate that all television sets be equipped to receive 
digital television signals, the 85 percent threshold penetration level can only be reached via a general 
mandate requiring all television sets sold in the United States to be capable of receiving off–air digital 
signals.   This is the position of the National Association of Broadcasters, advocating that the “FCC 
mandates all channel receivers as of date certain (e.g., Jan 1, 2004) for sets 13” and larger”  (Kraemer & 
Levine 2001, 39).  Current law does allow for cable television subscribers to count towards the 85 percent 
threshold, but only if cable operators carry all digital and analog signals.  The latter is required by “must 
carry” rules, but cable operators do not voluntarily carry all digital signals.  Again, broadcasters argue that 
new federal law is necessary: “Cable operators will not carry all analog and digital free–to–air broadcast 
television channels during the transition unless required to do so” (Kraemer & Levine 2001, 27, emphasis 
in original).  Even if digital must–carry were enacted, however, the 85 percent threshold would not likely 
be met without a digital receiver mandate.  Cable penetration is about 70 percent, while satellite TV 
penetration is 16 percent and rising.  DBS subscribers have little or no incentive to invest in off–air digital 
receivers, nor do non–cable subscribers (as is currently demonstrated by consumer purchase patterns).  
Hence, were dual cable must–carry enacted, achieving 85 percent penetration would remain an elusive 
goal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 15 
 
2.  Avoided costs for TV station upgrades. While just 202 stations were broadcasting 
in digital formats as of Spring 2001, all stations are required to do so by May 1, 2003. 
Delays are anticipated.
36 Presumably, the largest stations will generally meet the time 
schedule imposed by federal rules, while smaller stations will not. If the smallest 
1,000 stations can be released from this obligation, the savings would aggregate to 
over $1 billion.
37 (These savings are small compared to other gains associated with 
the DTTVSS, and are excluded from the final cost–benefit tally.) 
  
3.  The opportunity cost of TV Band spectrum. Because there is no market in radio 
spectrum, it is difficult to estimate what the resource might be worth in its highest 
valued use. Yet, if we theoretically constrain the TV Band spectrum to be allocated to 
PCS licenses, a very rough estimate is possible using data from the FCC’s PCS 
license auctions. In the A and B blocks, an auction was concluded in 1995 that 
produced an average valuation = $0.51 $/MHz/pop.
38 The C block auction concluded 
in May 1996 resulted in defaults and bankruptcies. The re–auction of the C block 
licenses concluded in January 2001, however, revealed recent market valuations = 
$4.18 per MHz per pop.
39 A linear extrapolation of these market valuations applied to 
the TV Band bounds the value of similar licenses allocated the 402 MHz of TV Band 
spectrum at between $52 billion and $470 billion.
40 
                                                 
36   Kraemer & Levine 2001, 23. 
37   The cost for a station to upgrade to digital transmission functionality is at least $1 million.  Digital 
production capabilities range from (an additional) $3 million to $4 million per station.  Kraemer & Levine 
2001, 22. 
38  “Pop” refers to “population,” making the metric a per capita valuation.  On the distinction between the 
value of wireless licenses and the value of radio spectrum, see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the 
Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big 
Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 15 HARV J L & TECH (forthcoming, Spring 2001), § IX. 
39   Source:  http://wtbwww13.fcc.gov/PCS/Broadband/BTA/Auction_35/Results/mdb/.  These bids may 
have been discounted due to legal risks anticipated by bidders.  (NextWave, a firm that declared bankruptcy 
after winning C Block licenses in 1996, asserted ownership of the licenses, eventually winning its case in 
court.)  This is the argument made by a former FCC member.  See: Harold Furchtgott–Roth, The Price of 
FCC Integrity: $15 Billion, WALL ST J (August 8, 2001), A12. 
40   The marginal value of bandwidth rights likely decline as the total allocated bandwidth rises, implying 
that linear extrapolation of PCS license sales prices tends to over–predict the prices of new (not fully 
anticipated) sales.  However, the expansion of bandwidth supply also generates higher consumer surplus; as 
wireless service suppliers compete more vigorously (with more bandwidth), consumers benefit.  Also, the 
TV Band frequencies are generally more desirable for wireless communications than the microwaves 
allocated to PCS, both due to the propagation characteristics of lower frequencies and due to the presence 
of fewer incumbent users.  An April 2001 analysis by Bernstein Research placed the upper bound of the TV                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 16 
 
 
The Costs of Doing It  
The major DTTVSS expense involves moving OTA TV viewers to alternative 
distribution channels. This can be achieved by identifying the ten million U.S. 
households wherein television programs are viewed without a subscription service, and 
providing them a “limited basic” package of services (including local TV signals) 
through a non–broadcast provider. The incremental cost of a new DBS subscriber––dish, 
receiver, and installation––is less than $300 retail.
41 The incremental cost of a cable 
subscriber––set–top receiver and installation––is less expensive than satellite. Taking the 
higher number suggests that ten million households could be served with television 
signals by cable or satellite for an aggregate up–front cost below $3 billion. The marginal 
social cost of additional viewers for these retransmitted television signals is zero. 
Subscription television companies also enjoy certain marketing advantages once they 
have incurred “customer acquisition” costs, meaning that they have established a 
relationship with the household and a link to its television set. Competitive bidding 
among suppliers and/or consortia should reveal the cost of efficiently serving this residual 
market with local TV signals. A lump sum expenditure of $3 billion appears an upper 
bound estimate, with operating expenses approximately zero. 
 
Transitional Issues and Prophylactic Measures  
The recommended policy reform is ambitious and the FCC’s traditional 
regulatory structure guards against sweeping new measures. Yet, the proposal should be 
weighed against the realistic alternative: the ongoing digital television transition is 
already imposing substantial net social costs. Moreover, there is no light at the end of the 
FCC’s DTV tunnel. The DTTVSS follows a new path, bypassing the massive consumer 
                                                                                                                                                 
band’s market value (in alternative use) at $367 billion.  Michael Calabrese, Principles for Spectrum Policy 
Reform, New America Foundation Working Paper (Oct. 2001), 4.   
41 An RCA DIRECTV PLUS System with Dual Output LNBs and Receiver: $149.99.  
http://www.radioshack.com/product.asp?catalog%5Fname=CTLG&category%5Fname=CTLG%5F002%5
F002%5F002%5F000&product%5Fid=16%2D2603 (visited Aug. 23, 2001).  This includes both a dish and 
a receiver units, but additional receivers are required for additional television sets. Programming is sold 
separately.   And RCA Dish–Do–It–Yourself installation kit for the DirecTV system is sold for $59.99.  
http://www.radioshack.com/product.asp?catalog%5Fname=CTLG&category%5Fname=CTLG%5F002%5
F002%5F002%5F000&product%5Fid=16%2D2551 (visited Aug. 23, 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 17 
 
expenditures scheduled by the FCC’s “Advanced Television” plan and delivering 
exceptionally valuable spectrum to entrepreneurs queuing for permission to offer 
innovative technologies and advanced wireless services. Importantly, this policy route 
simply follows the trail blazed by consumers; today’s marketplace reveals that customers 
are buying multi–channel video in large numbers, while refusing to invest in the off–air 
digital television transition mapped out by regulators. 
Some may argue that no TV Band reallocation can proceed if even  one U.S. 
household loses access to even a fraction of one OTA broadcast channel. This argument 
conflicts with the status quo. Under current rules, up to fifteen percent of households in 
each TV market will lose access to OTA television signals, as analog s tations are 
scheduled to go “dark” when 85% of local homes obtain OTA digital TV reception 
capability. Equipping a household to receive such signals costs about $700 today ($1700 
for all 2.43 TV sets in the average home). Eliminating these costs while delivering large 
benefits to subscribers and non–subscribers alike offers a dominant economic and 
political alternative. 
Several accompanying reforms can serve to bolster the likelihood of successful 
implementation of the DTTVSS. Here is a preliminary list. 
 
1.  Limit subsidies. Not only would introduction of a subscription TV “entitlement” 
be controversial, it would tend to undermine the basic dynamics driving the 
opportunity for reform. Households subscribing to video services shoulder the cost of 
making TV Band spectrum available for other socially valuable services. Subsidizing 
free “limited basic” service can be justified as a transitional device producing useful 
reforms. But to the degree such funding slows the natural consumer migration to 
cable and satellite television, it thwarts progress. If “limited basic” subsidies are 
included in policy implementation, they should be restricted in scope (just over–the–
air signals), time, and number of sets (a single connection per household would seem 
to fulfill the objective of providing “lifeline” services to low–income households).  
  
2.  Allow DBS entry. Since 1994, Northpoint Technologies has been endeavoring to 
obtain FCC permission to offer a third customer option (head–to–head with EchoStar                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 18 
 
and DirecTV) in multi–channel video subscription service via satellite.
42 Northpoint 
has a patented spectrum–sharing technology wherein the frequency space already 
utilized by incumbent satellite operators (12.2 GHz to 12.7 GHz) is additionally used 
for terrestrial microwave links delivering individual customers 100–channel video 
packages. This digital programming will include satellite and local TV broadcasts, as 
well as high–speed Internet access service, via local fixed wireless systems. By 
issuing Northpoint’s license (and all such requests) quickly, the FCC would 
encourage entrepreneurship and instantly create an additional nationwide competitor 
in multi–channel video distribution service.
43 Most important for the DTTVSS, 
Northpoint would offer not only a fourth competitive option  in local cable TV 
markets,
44 but one that would most closely rival cable in transmitting all local 
broadcast TV stations to customers. 
  
3.  Allow cable competition. Some success was achieved in two 1996 
Telecommunication Act provisions encouraging cable competition. The first was an 
end to the telco/cable cross–ownership ban, making it legal for entrants to offer a 
bundle of telecommunications services including voice, data, and video. The business 
models of local cable market entrants rely heavily on these multiple revenue streams.
 
45 Second, the Act created a federal franchise (OVS) allowing new competitors to 
sidestep franchise barriers at the municipal level.
46 A number of large–scale cable 
“overbuilders” emerged after the Act, the most important being RCN, a  public 
company constructing video/telephony systems in Boston, New York, Washington, 
D.C., and other major markets.
 47  
                                                 
42   Northpoint Technologies, in partnership with Broadwave, outlines its technology and service plans at:  
http://www.broadwave.com/ 
43   The author filed an economic analysis of the FCC’s licensing decision at the Commission on behalf of 
Northpoint Technologies in 2001.  
44   Should the two DBS rivals merge, as per EchoStar’s October 2001 takeover proposal for Hughes 
Network Systems (owner of DirecTV), the quick licensing of Northpoint becomes all the more important. 
45   Cable Overbuilders––Down but Not Out, CREDIT SUISSE/FIRST BOSTON EQUITY RESEARCH (Feb. 12, 
2001).   
46   Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 50 
HASTINGS L J (Aug. 1999), 1359, 1382–83. 
47   By mid–2001 RCN attracted 541,000 video subscribers.  WideOpenWest (310,000), Knology 
(193,000), and Millenium Digital Media (150,000) also garnered more subscribers in head–to–head rivalry 
with established cable operators than any firm to emerge after the Cable Acts of 1984 or 1992 (both of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 19 
 
Yet, local franchise authorities often continue to tilt against new entrants, 
ostensibly to protect the incumbent from unfair competition.
48 These local restrictions 
foreclose competitive opportunities, in that OVS licenses––which impose extensive 
network sharing obligations––are imperfect substitutes.
49 Early in 2001 RCN 
abandoned a two–and–a–half year effort to win a Philadelphia cable franchise, 
alleging that the City Council was “buckling to the influence of Philadelphia–based 
Comcast Corp., the region’s dominant cable provider.”
50 RCN’s 2000 Annual Report 
details numerous regulatory burdens associated with OVS licenses, and notes that 
local franchise barriers eliminated its planned entry into the City of Philadelphia.
51 
Municipalities should be barred from imposing burdens on cable entrants; 
generic liability rules (typically in place in local public works departments) 
appropriately limit public disruption. Further burdens are unnecessary and counter–
productive, limiting competitive entry. Federal reform of OVS license requirements 
can assist in providing a less costly substitute to the municipal cable franchise. 
Elimination of OTA television broadcasting will itself increase aggregate penetration 
in the multi–channel video distribution market, and a package of pro–competitive 
measures could successfully channel this development to produce additional 
consumer benefits. Recent FCC survey data suggest that markets in which two cable 
                                                                                                                                                 
which ostensibly promoted competition).  See:  Carolina Broadband Puts Cable on Hold,  KAGAN 
BROADBAND, No. 476 (June 26, 2001), 1; Thomas W. Hazlett and George S. Ford,  The Fallacy of 
Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the ‘Level Playing Field’ in Cable TV Franchising Statutes 
[“Hazlett & Ford 2001”], 3 BUS & POLITICS 21 (April 2001), 28. 
48   Hazlett & Ford 2001. 
49   In fact, cable overbuilders entering markets under federal OVS licenses typically seek to obtain local 
cable franchises, switching regulatory jurisdictions.  This allows them to shed requirements allowing 
independent programmers (and, in some cases, direct competitors) to use their conduits on regulated terms 
and conditions.  This limited OVS subscribership to just 60,000 households as of June 2000.  Federal 
Communications Commission,  Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, Seventh Annual Report, CS Docket No. 00–132 (Jan. 8, 2001), C1.  Even 
with an OVS license, a cable operator must still obtain certain local permits for access to rights–of–way. 
50   Ken Dilanian and Wendy Tanaka, RCN Pulls Cable–TV Proposal, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER (Feb. 15, 
2001).  See also:  RCN to Philly: See Ya,  BROADBAND  WEEK (Fed. 19, 2001), 
http://www.broadbandweek.com/news/010219/print/010219_news_rcn.htm; The Insider,  Saidel Slams 
Shunning of RCN by Philadelphia,  PHIL  BUS  J (Feb. 19, 2001), 
http://philadelphia.bcentral.com/philadelphia/stories/2001/02/19/tidbits.html. 
51   RCN Annual Report for the Year Ended Dec. 31, 2000 –– 10K–K405, filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (April 2, 2001), 15–17.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 20 
 




4.  Permit efficient digital television broadcasting. Despite the vast inefficiencies 
exhibited in current and planned FCC uses of the TV Band for OTA television 
broadcasting, it is possible that OTA television can productively serve an important 
niche in the telecommunications marketplace. In the bidding for a transition plan, 
broadcasters (and others) should be invited to compete. Serving non–subscriber TV 
households via OTA transmissions may, in fact, prove a competitive solution relative 
to service delivery by subscription service providers even when the opportunity cost 
of spectrum (configured differently than today) is taken into account. 
Suppose that OTA digital receivers fall to $200 per unit. Ten million OTA 
households could then be served local broadcast TV transmissions in digital format 
for an aggregate cost of about $2 billion. In moving to digital format, however, 
bandwidth is economized. Standard definition TV (STV) signals, of slightly higher 
resolution than today’s analog broadcasts, can be transmitted on about 1 MHz, and do 
not require inter–channel separation (guard bands to limit interference). Even the 
most crowded TV market (e.g., Los Angeles) could retain OTA programming 
utilizing just four adjacent 6 MHz channels. 
While unlikely, it is not impossible that television broadcasting would emerge 
a net demander in an auction of TV Band spectrum. If channels were p acked 
efficiently by the full complement of digital transmission and receiving techniques 
now available, additional bandwidth to create large packages of OTA programming 
could promote rivalry with subscription video systems.  Allowing liberal use of TV 
Band radio spectrum would test such opportunities in a competitive marketplace. 
   
                                                 
52    Federal Communications Commission,  Report on Cable Industry Prices, MM Docket No. 92–266 
(Released February 14, 2001).  Cable systems in competitive (duopoly) markets charged an average 
monthly rate for basic service of $32.40, while monopoly systems charged a mean of $34.11. The FCC also 
found that competitors offered an average of 59.9 channels, while monopoly systems featured just 54.8.  
This resulted in a price per channel for competitive systems of 57¢, as opposed to 66¢ charged in monopoly 
systems.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 21 
 
5.  Promote last–mile broadband. Internet TV is the end of broadcasting. Replacing 
one–way, standardized “broadcasts” with interactive “narrowcasts” upgrades video 
program delivery in multiple dimensions.  To enable networks to carry data–intensive 
video programming much higher bandwidth is needed, particularly in last–mile 
connections.  Across–the–board deregulation can provide investment incentives to 
spur deployment of high–speed cable access, DSL, fixed wireless, mobile wireless, 
and satellite.
53 Policy liberalization that allows TV Band spectrum to be reallocated to 
broadband Internet access––the key element in the DTTVSS––will itself prove a 
substantial impetus to network development. To ensure the growth of advanced video 
delivery systems, policy makers should embrace rapid spectrum reallocation. 
“Safeguards” that delay this reallocation actually raise risks for new, pro–consumer 
technologies. 
 
The Trade–off Tally   
Although the quantification measures are crude, the cost–benefit ratio is so 
decidedly balanced in favor of DTTVSS as opposed to the OTA digital TV plan now 
being executed that the analysis is compelling. Importantly, the methods used to evaluate 
the options bound the estimates in a convenient manner. The value consumers place on 
continued OTA use of the TV Band are capped by the cost of delivering equivalent or 
better services. Since cable and satellite delivery systems offer enhanced quality for 
viewers (in both signal quality and potential selection), the cost of connecting the last 
remaining over–the–air TV viewers to subscription TV service is a reliable upper bound 
on valuation.  
The linear extrapolation of PCS license values actually represents a conservative 
approach in that it focuses solely on producers’ surplus. License prices equal the present 
value of anticipated profit streams, discounted at risk–adjusted discount rates. Consumer 
surplus is likely, however, to be some multiple of the producers’ surplus captured in 
license bids. For instance, Jerry Hausman estimates that the gain in consumer surplus 
from the introduction of cellular telephones amounted to $24 billion to $50 billion 
annually. Gregory L. Rosston estimated that, if auctioned by the FCC in 1982, cellular 
                                                 
53   Thomas W. Hazlett, Why Are We in a Broadband Recession? CNET NEWS.COM (July 28, 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 22 
 
licenses might have brought as much as $30 billion in aggregate.
54 Hence, using 
conservative projections either way, the total discounted present value of producers’ 
surplus is about equivalent to the annual gains seen by consumers. This implies that, 
using a real social discount rate of 5%, the consumer benefits swamp auction receipts by 
twenty to one.  
 
 
TABLE 5. TRADE–OFFS FROM THE DIGITAL TELEVISION  
TRANSITION VIA SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES (DTTVSS) 
 
COSTS  BENEFITS 
Broadcast TV service non–
subscriber households 
Avoided DTV set costs  TV Band Available for Wireless 
Telecommunications Services 
* 10M households  * embedded base = 245M 
sets 
* 402 MHz 
* unit costs < $300  
(set–top boxes and installs) 
* unit costs = $200 to $600  * 1996 A/B Block PCS mean 
prices = $0.51/MHz/pop 
* nominal operating costs 
(marginal cost = 0) 
  * 2001 C Block PCS reauction 
mean prices = $4.18/MHz/pop 
  BENEFITS: $49B––$147B  BENEFITS: $52B––$470B  
 
TOTAL COST = $3B 
 
 
TOTAL BENEFITS = $101B––$617B 
 
IV.  Public Interest Arguments  
 
Reallocation of radio spectrum is controversial. Moreover, the administrative 
system in place since the 1927 Radio Act systematically over–estimates the costs of 
                                                 
54   Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications 22–23, in 
Martin Baily et al., eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity––Microeconomics (1997).  This was the 
estimate of consumer gains from the introduction of cellular.  Had there been an auction to assign cellular 
licenses in 1982, likely receipts were estimated by Gregory L. Rosston,  An Economic Analysis of the 
Effects of FCC Regulation on Land Mobile Radio, STAN U DEPT OF ECON PHD DISS (1994), 145.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 23 
 
enhanced competition and new technologies, and underestimates the gains.
55 A key 
element facilitating such results is the statutory obligation of the regulatory agency to 
operate not according to consumer welfare, but “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity.”  
 
The Public Interest Standard 
The historical pattern in spectrum is that once airwaves are allocated, they are 
extremely difficult to reallocate. Four aspects of the regulatory standard prompt this 
outcome. First, “public interest” is an exceedingly vague term, giving the Commission 
wide latitude to exercise its discretion. Second, because incumbents protected from 
competition (by licensing barriers) are always willing and able to divert some portion of 
super–competitive profits to politically popular expenditures, the supply of “public 
interests” manufactured by incumbent licensees is both highly elastic, on the one side, 
and particularly effective, on the other. Third, because there are no time limits, standards 
of proof, or rules governing cost–benefit calculations, entrants applying for new spectrum 
allocations must engage in a relatively high–cost, long–lived adjudication process. 
Finally, because entrants typically have less capital invested in “working” the regulatory 
system, and (not coincidentally) have less to gain from market access (competitors 
anticipate lower earnings than monopolists, ceteris paribus), the open–ended debate over 
public interest criteria heavily favors incumbents. 
These structural biases are still in place. Yet, there are at least two factors at work 
in the DTTVSS that suggest the bias against welfare–enhancing spectrum reallocation 
may be overcome. The first is that organized beneficiaries of reform may, due to 
relatively dramatic and fundamental changes in the economy, be amassing political 
strength. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
The second factor is t hat broadcast regulation has developed a set of public 
interest rationales that, in the current policy proposal, tilt heavily in favor of reform. At 
bottom, the opportunity cost of the TV Band has become clearer with the development of 
both wireless and wireline networks in the Internet Economy.  It is now possible to 
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identify the social losses from reduced mobile telephone competition, delayed advanced 
wireless networks, and artificially restricted broadband access. The TV Band 
opportunities plainly visible in other markets cloud traditional public interest arguments 
for TV broadcasting. 
That the marketplace transition to subscription television is effectively removing 
the public interest rationale for the TV Band allocation has already begun to resonate 
politically. In 1996, when former Senator John Ashcroft (R–MO) pondered government 
subsidies to complete the shift to cable television service so as to clear the TV Band for 
alternative uses, he posed the question as follows: “My commitment is to maintain free 
television, but I do not have a commitment to maintain free television if that misallocates 
a valuable resource of the country, namely, spectrum.”
56 
Historically, the public interests associated with television broadcasting are: (a) 
localism; (b) provision of ubiquitous news and information (and emergency warnings); 
(c) assuring a diversity of information sources; and (d) universal service. The current TV 
Band allocation demonstrably hurts each public interest. Localism benefits to the extent 
that more consumers access the Internet at higher speeds; customized content brings 
neighborhoods and virtual communities into close proximity. “Broadcast” media are 
inherently inferior at promoting localism compared to flexible, scalable networks created 
online.  
Information sources accessed by the Internet are vastly more numerous, and 
diverse, than anything offered by OTA television. Universal service is, in a very limited 
sense, provided by OTA TV: the great majority of Americans can get some video 
programming by buying a television set. But infusing the mobile telephone market with 
new radio spectrum inputs could easily double or triple system capacity, slashing prices 
and pushing wireless telephone penetration towards one hundred percent. This form of 
universal service has enormous health and safety benefits, and allows for far superior 
emergency communications compared to OTA television. 
While some incumbent interests will no doubt resort to public interest arguments 
to defend against the DTTVSS, those arguments c an and should be highlighted by 
proponents of TV Band reallocation: They constitute powerful ancillary rationales to the 
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cost–benefit analysis suggesting that social welfare is vastly improved by shifting all 
video broadcasting to subscription service. 
 
Digital Must Carry 
Now being considered by the FCC, digital must carry would force cable operators 
to retransmit, without charge, digital signals broadcast by local TV stations. “Analog” 
must carry is already in place, mandated by the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992, and permitted as constitutional in a 1997 ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
57 The policy grants local TV broadcast stations a property right to cable 
television carriage.
58 Digital must carry would extend this right to digital TV 
broadcasts.
59 Must carry rights on satellite systems were also awarded broadcasters in the 
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA).
60 The measure gave DBS 
systems the right to carry local stations (for a negotiated fee), but imposed must carry 
obligations as of Jan. 1, 2002.
61  
  The must–carry policy has been offered as a means to expedite TV Band 
reallocation: If TV stations are guaranteed alternative distribution, they are less likely to 
oppose reallocation. This view ignores both the costs of granting such rights and the 
long–run regulatory dynamics. The substantial net benefits gained in rationalizing the 
transition to digital television accrue from eliminating the administrative allocation of 
radio spectrum and allowing market  competitors to respond to consumer demand in 
supplying services. Must carry actually extends the central planning mechanism in TV 
Band spectrum to new domains––cable’s “spectrum in a tube,” and satellite band 
broadcasting. Pushing the allocation into relatively more abundant media looks initially 
to be a good bargain, for the marginal cost of the regulation (delivery of more valuable 
                                                 
57   Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
58  The TV station may elect to bargain with the cable system for a carriage fee (retransmission consent), or 
it may simply “take” a cable slot at a price of zero (no compensation either way).   
59   See:  Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing “Must Carry” under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 S CT 
ECON REV 141 (2000) [“Hazlett 2000”]. 
60   The carriage obligation kicks in when the satellite TV operator carries some stations in a local TV 
market––if any, then all.   
61   In satellite, must carry obligations kick in when the DBS operator elects to carry some local signals in a 
given market: ‘if any, then all.’                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 26 
 
programs or services) falls. But the costs of expanding broadcast regulation, and 
mandating that low–valued programming substitute for high–valued, are substantial.
62 
There are also long–run regulatory consequences of this policy. By granting 
television broadcasters special claims to portions of rival delivery systems, these 
licensees continue to receive rents under the public interest standard. They are thus 
rewarded for protecting what remains of the TV Band, the source of their protected 
status. Since eliminating the “TV Band” in favor of a generic Wireless 
Telecommunications Services designation is the goal of liberalization, must carry drives a 
key constituency to oppose reform.  
  Dual must carry also impedes the DTTVSS by hampering competition in the 
multi-channel video sector, handicapping DBS operators vis–à–vis cable TV systems. 
Since the November 1999 passage of SHVIA, satellite TV systems have sold customers 
local broadcast TV packages typically consisting of the Top 4 local signals plus a 
national PBS feed, at an incremental monthly charge of $5––$6. (The viewer receives 
local ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox affiliates, plus national Public Broadcasting System 
programming.) Local signals can be distributed this way to about forty markets (today 
EchoStar offers local signals in 36 markets, DirecTV in 41), using just 161 channels of 
capacity [(40 * 4) + 1]. Only the largest seven U.S. markets could be served with this 
allotment of channel slots under must carry. While DBS operators expect to expand 
capacity through new satellite launches and spot beam technology, the same basic trade–
offs will hold. For instance, 601 channels could be used to serve either 150 markets with 
Top 4 + PBS packages, or just the 48 largest markets under must carry. The channel 
capacity to serve all 210 television markets with 4+1 packages would require as many as 
841 slots; but these would be consumed by must carry obligations in the top 76 markets. 
See Appendix 1. 
  The transition to subscription–based television broadcasting is an opportunity to 
eliminate the inefficiencies of must carry. Those inefficiencies divert spectrum to 
                                                 
62   Hazlett 2000, op cit.  Mandating that cable operators provide two broadcast signals emanating from 
each local broadcast facility would result in providing the typical subscriber about 26 channels of must 
carry transmissions, with the marginal value of stations beyond the top few being close to zero.  This would 
consume a large percentage of the capacity of basic cable packages, excluding many highly valued cable 
networks from carriage.  As must carry obligations adhere to the lowest tier of service, digital programming 
tiers (carrying higher charges and requiring service upgrades) do not satisfy the requirement.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  27 
 
relatively low–valued uses, blocking the provision of programs consumers are willing to 
pay more to access.
63 In simple terms, must carry is a victory for home shopping 
networks which profit handsomely from forced access to cable systems (at a price of 
zero), and a defeat for cable–only  networks struggling to gain carriage in a world of 
scarce channel slots.
64 A preferred regulatory alternative to must–carry would be 
licensing Northpoint Technologies, the seven–year applicant seeking to provide terrestrial 
retransmission of satellite and l ocal TV signals. The technology is well–suited for 
product differentiation by market, and the company’s announced business plan includes 
rebroadcast of all local TV signals.
65 
 
Mandating or Subsidizing Digital Television Sets 
Given the inert consumer response to the OTA digital television transition, some 
interests advocate federal rules to compel massive investments in new technology.
66 Not 
only is brute regulatory force high risk (efficiency cross–checks, including consumer 
feedback, are entirely ignored), but the policy is not likely to work on its own terms. 
Evidence for this comes from the historical precedent cited by advocates of such a policy: 
the 1962 UHF All–Channel Receiver Act. 
  Some see the early days of UHF television as analogous to the current OTA 
digital TV transition. Investments by new UHF licensees were slow in coming, because 
investors feared that no one would watch the programming offered. TV sets, which could 
receive VHF signals reasonably well, offered little reception for UHF. Until viewers 
understood that desirable programming was to be offered on UHF broadcasts, however, 
they would continue to eschew expensive new TV sets with expanded viewing capability. 
  This chicken–or–egg problem was the rationale for the 1962 law mandating that 
TV sets sold in the United States after Jan. 1, 1964 be equipped to receive UHF channels. 
In the appraisal of some, the law worked. Customers had no choice but––if they bought a 
new set––to buy UHF functionality. This helped scale economies to kick in, bringing 
                                                 
63   Vita and Wiegand, Must–Carry Regulations (1993), op cit.; Vita, Must Carry Regulations (1997). 
64   C–SPAN, the public affairs, commercial–free cable network is a particularly outspoken opponent of 
must carry rules.  See: www.c–span.org and www.mustcarry.org.   
65   See:  www.broadwave.com. 
66   Kraemer & Levine 2001, 34.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 28 
 
down the incremental cost of this feature. And the increasing household penetration of 
UHF receivers gave investors the incentive to develop new stations and popular content. 
Douglas Webbink evaluated the transition to UHF, however, and found that the 
UHF reception mandate did not deliver viewer benefits sufficient to offset the increased 
cost of television sets to consumers.
67  Webbink’s evidence is consistent with that 
examined here. As seen in Figure 2, UHF stations did increase (using this as a proxy for 
investment) after 1964, but educational/public stations actually increased by more than 
did commercial stations. This suggests that licensing policies or other factors not related 
to UHF receiver penetration accounts for the increase. Moreover, a much more 
substantial increase in UHF stations occurs in the early 1980s––on the heels of federal 
cable television deregulation. 







































VHF com UHF com UHF-ETV
 
Note: com=commercial TV station; ETV = public (educational) TV station 
   
Two rival theories emerge. The first is that UHF station development is primarily 
due to the 1964 UHF Television All–Receiver Act mandate. The second is that the 
emergence of cable television helped eliminate the inferior signal quality of UHF 
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stations: over a cable system, UHF Channel 56 looks just as nice as VHF Channel 7. 
(This improves both UHF quality and coverage, as more households in the local market 
see a given UHF station as a viable viewing choice.) The theories can be tested against 
the evidence. Three specifications are estimated in OLS regressions attempting to predict 
the number of TV stations. Independent variables include: YEAR (the time trend), a 
DUMMY for the UHF TV set law (= 1 for years 1964 and after, 0 otherwise), and 
CABLE SUBS (national subscribership). Regressions are separately run for the following 
television station categories: Commercial VHF, Commercial UHF, Public UHF (ETV), 
Total UHF, and Total ETV. 
The results, shown in Table 6, indicate that there was no increase in trend for 
UHF stations around the time of the 1964 mandate. On the other hand, cable 
subscribership is highly correlated with the number of commercial UHF stations. These 
results support the view that promoting a rival distribution medium by removing 
regulatory barriers was a more effective policy to promote a fledgling television service 
than industrial policy mandates. 
  
 
TABLE 6. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE = NO. OF TV STATIONS IN U.S.) 
 






































No. Observ.  37  37  37  37  37 
R–squared  0.989  0.995  0.995  0.995  0.998 
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V.  Motivating The DTTVSS 
 
Considerable interest group support will favor a transition away from OTA 
broadcasting in the TV Band. Development of increasingly valuable communication 
networks would be positively and strongly affected by this opportunity to unleash new 
wireless applications and to spur further competition in mobile telephony. This support 
extends to (some) network operators, infrastructure suppliers, hardware and software 
producers, chip makers, and a broad range of content and application vendors.  
Further support is likely from multi–channel video program distributors (MPVD) 
who see increased aggregate MVPD subscribership as profit–enhancing. Subscription TV 
providers will see the opportunity to bid on a service plan to supply OTA households 
with broadcast services during a finite transition period as a discrete opportunity to 
enhance system scale. Incumbent interests such as the Department of Defense and the 
MMDS licensees (multi-channel, multipoint distribution services, predominantly 
MCI/WorldCom, Sprint, and Nucentrix) will also welcome the DTTVSS to the extent it 
serves as a defense against a “taking” of airwaves allocated to their services (in the 1.7 
GHz and 2.5 GHz bands, respectively) in the push for 3G wireless. 
Broadcast stations have traditionally blocked reallocation of TV Band spectrum. 
These incumbents formulate estimates not only of the transfers that would make them 
better off from the DTTVSS than from the current digital television transition, but from 
also of total social gains from reform. Because incumbent interests have consistently 
exercised veto power over spectrum reallocation at the Federal Communications 
Commission, the traditional path is to hold out for a substantial share of total gains.  
A bargain may be crafted that would motivate sufficient slices of the sector to 
endorse reform, enabling the DTTVSS. First, in what is an unprecedented signal, 
broadcasters in Channels 60–69 are today attempting to trade their allocated spectrum to 
new wireless entrants. In particular, the largest holder of licenses in this 700 MHz band, 
Paxson, is anxious to allow overlay rights to be sold at auction so that it may bargain with 
new rights holders.
68 Even if the price proves steep, this indicates that some broadcasters 
are moving into the spectrum marketplace, weakening cartel support for rigid allocation. 
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Second, the television broadcasting industry is rapidly losing video program 
market share. This means that broadcasters have less and less to lose from abandoning 
OTA transmissions. With the expansion of subscription television, with or without the 
DTTVSS, broadcast stations see their market influence dwindling. This raises the relative 
cost of current regulations blocking TV station participation in a spectrum market. 
Third, the value of radio spectrum in alternative use appears to be rising. Jan. 
2001 PCS C Block re–auction bids were more than eight times those for A and B Block 
licenses sold in 1995. As the opportunity cost of airwaves rise, more and more  TV 
stations see their allocated spectrum worth more when deployed in a non–television 
application. 
Fourth, popular cable networks are financially prosperous. Those stations that 
produce original programs (or are owned by networks who produce such content) are 
conflicted in using valuable airwaves to deliver these programs OTA. By engaging in 
traditional broadcasting, these programmers deny themselves access to more efficient 
distribution channels and sacrifice the revenues available from using TV Band 
frequencies for wireless telecommunications. In essence, TV broadcasters have two 
component parts: Content Production (CP) and Content Distribution (CD). While CP 
declines in value due to competition from cable networks, CD is increasingly high–cost.  
Converting OTA television broadcasting to the full subscription video model in 
the DTTVSS would allow stations to streamline distribution while (assuming vested 
rights in the spectrum allocated TV licenses, as outlined above) capturing the value of 
alternative use of radio waves. A TV station need not use OTA airwaves for CD to 
realize the value associated with CP. Market valuations of cable networks can be 
compared to those for broadcast television stations. Broadcast stations engage in both CP 
and CD; cable networks also engage in CP, but use non–OTA systems for CD. In short: 
 
Value (Broadcast Station) = Value (CP) + Value (CD),  
whereas Value (Cable Network) = Value (CP). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 32 
 
The disadvantage of the cable network vis–a–vis broadcast stations is that it must 
rely on other systems for program distribution.
69 Were the TV station to adopt the cable 
network business model, it would trade off the: 
 
Cost of Distributing TV Programming via Satellite and Cable  
vs. the Value of the TV Spectrum in Alternative Use. 
 
This short–term trade–off may look attractive to broadcasters because cable and 
satellite systems pay per–subscriber license fees for program services. In fact, cable 
networks that garner only a small fraction of the audience shares attracted by broadcast 
network programming, receive substantial revenue from subscription TV service provides 
(i.e., cable and satellite systems). This broadcaster revenue source is limited today, 
despite that the opportunity to negotiate carriage fees rather than assert must carry rights, 
because the availability of OTA signals limits consumer demand for retransmission. By 
foregoing the OTA market, broadcasters could increase this revenue stream due to less 
elastic input demand from subscription TV suppliers. 
Strategic considerations (including ease of entry for new competitors) complicate 
broadcaster decision–making. But a transition that carried broadcast programs to all U.S. 
households via subscription service, ended OTA broadcast TV programming, and 
allowed broadcasters to assert effective ownership of 6 –12 MHz of TV Band radio 
spectrum reallocated to generic wireless telecommunications, would be likely to 
immediately enhance profits. Stations would realize spectrum values, while continuing to 
compete in the television programming market as do cable networks today. Broadcast TV 
stations are now worth an average of about $80 to $130 per household in their local 
viewing areas.
70 Cable networks, with far lower ratings and no distribution capacity, sell 
in some instances for as much as broadcast stations. See Figure 3. 
                                                 
69   One method of cable program distribution involves vertical integration, as with AOL Time Warner (an 
owner of both cable networks and cable systems).  It should also be noted, however, that another major 
cable network owner, Viacom, actually divested its cable systems in the 1990s.  
70   The average sales price for TV stations traded in 1998 or 1999 (excluding group sales) was $79.57 per 
household.   In a regression model that adjusts for network affiliation, VHF channel assignment, and 
number of stations in the market, the value of an additional household at the mean sample values = $130.  
See Appendix 3.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 33 
 
Figure 3.  Sales Prices of Cable 





















































      
Source: Paul Kagan Assoc., Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2000 (July 1999), 98. 
 
 Regional sports networks command a price as high as broadcast stations. ESPN, 
sold in July 1995, is a mature property with penetration into essentially every 
subscription television home in the United States, but with just a fraction the ratings of 
broadcast network TV affiliates. See Table 7. When last traded it was valued at over $59 
per household––near with TV stations traded for during 1998–99. The implication is that 
some stations, and perhaps broadcast TV networks,
71 could realize valuations superior to 
cable networks, profit from spectrum rights sales, and emerge financially better off in the 
DTTVSS.  
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   Some broadcast television networks already see the trade–offs shifting in favor of 
non–broadcast program distribution. The fifth–largest U.S. television network is Warner 
Brothers (WB). Of the network’s 166 affiliates, less than one–half are full–power TV 
stations. Eighty–two are cable “stations,” channels on local cable system that carry 
broadcast programming, and two are low–power TV stations, where viewership is gained 




TABLE 7. PRIME TIME RATINGS FOR  
BROADCAST AND CABLE NETWORKS 
 




Broadcast Network       
NBC  7.8  7971600   
CBS  8.3  8482600   
ABC  8.0  8176000   
Fox  5.8  5927600   
UPN  2.4  2452800   
WB  2.4  2452800   
Cable Network      2000 License 
Fee ($Per sub 
per mo.) 
Lifetime  1.9  1941800  0.29 
USA Network  1.8  1839600  0.42 
TNT  1.7  1737400  0.68 
Cartoon Network  1.7  1737400  0.19 
TBS  1.6  1635200  0.38 
Nickelodeon  1.5  1533000  0.59 
A&E  1.2  1226400  0.36 
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Discovery Channel  1.1  1124200  0.33 
TNN  1.0  1022000  0.45 
ESPN  0.9  919800  0.93 
MTV  0.8  817600  0.45 
AMC  0.7  715400  0.21 
BET  0.6  613200  0.14 
Food Network  0.5  511000  0.09 
The Travel Channel  0.4  408800  0.16 
Bravo  0.4  408800  0.11 
Odyssey  0.4  408800  0.06 
ESPN2  0.4  408800  0.25 
Notes: Broadcast network ratings are averages for 10/02/00–6/10/01; cable ratings are 
averages for the quarter ending 6/30/01. There are 1,022,000 households per ratings 
point.  
Sources:  http://tv.zap2it.com/news/ratings/networks/010624network.html; John M. 
Higgins, Girls beat Waterboy; Lifetime tops second–quarter prime time cable Nielsens, 
BROADCASTING AND CABLE (July 9, 2001), 9; Ratings ,CABLE WORLD (July 23, 2001), 
45. Kagan’s Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2000, 60–62, 132, 157. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
  A natural transition to digital video programming is well under way, and it can be 
utilized to rescue the seemingly hopeless “Advanced Television” initiative now officially 
in its 14
th year at the Federal Communications Commission. Consumers have 
demonstrated no interest in spending extra billions on digital television sets, and 
television broadcasters are refusing to invest in programming that those without digital 
receivers have no ability to view. A transition has been scheduled, but don’t expect many 
to attend. 
  Ironically, consumers and suppliers are flocking to a transition being held just 
across the street. In the subscription television marketplace, the digital video business is 
brisk. This fortuitous development is fine on its own, but far more valuable in the context 
of salvaging the misallocation of resources committing a vast expanse of prime 
spectrum––67 channels of VHF/UHF radio frequencies, 6 MHz each––to an analog                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 36 
 
television service of very limited scope, with technology from t he 1939–53 epoch 
locked–in by regulation. 
The social costs of forcing “Advanced Television” via the FCC’s spectrum 
allocation process are enormous; between approximately $100 billion and $600 billion 
could be gained by allowing the marketplace to reallocate the TV Band to higher valued 
uses. In the process, consumers would be spared substantial expense––the avoided costs 
in not purchasing digital TV sets they are reluctant to purchase at today’s incremental 
prices––and, more importantly, avail themselves of the benefits of torrents of new 
competition and service innovation by unleashing over twice the wireless bandwidth now 
allocated for all of wireless telephony. 
  The transition to subscription television will be ninety–one percent complete by 
2006 just on its own momentum. Perhaps the coming public policy train wreck, penciled 
onto our digital TV calendars for five years from now, will supply the necessary impetus 
to seriously engage the crafting of policy alternatives embracing consumer choices rather 
than suppressing them. The regulatory status quo today appears difficult to displace; but 
that is the way the status quo always appears. And yet, on occasion, beneficial reforms 
are born. It is instructive to review the prognostication of eminent FCC experts on the 
prospects for moving away from the inefficient and politically–charged comparative 
hearings process. While advancing the case for license auctions, former FCC member 
Glen O. Robinson wrote the following words in 1978: 
 
As an apparent commentary on the political naiveté of my proposal [for 
auctioning FCC licenses], my successor at the Commission and one of my 
former colleagues recently noted that the odds on the adoption of a lottery 




  The conventional wisdom was wrong. Lotteries were approved by Congress in 
1981, and were in use at the FCC by 1984. Auctions were approved in 1993, and being                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 37 
 
conducted in 1994. One unthinkable reform became public policy in three years; another 
in fifteen. This suggests putting some chips on the Easter Bunny or, perhaps, a transition 









                                                                                                                                                 
73   Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 
VIRGINIA L R 169, 243.  The text includes a citation for the “Preakness” comment:  Broadcast Renewal 
Applicant, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 434 n.2 (1977) (Hooks & Fogarty, Comm’rs) (separate statement).   
74   FCC Chairman Michael Powell has suggested that the TV Band reallocation should be considered, and 
a recent Legg Mason report laid out the following scenario.  “… TV stations were not in immediate danger 
of losing their spectrum. But political forces could shift if cable and DBS penetration climbs above 90 
percent, if Japan and Europe race ahead of the U.S. in the advanced wireless data market and if lawmakers 
need to patch big holes in the budget with spectrum auction revenue.” Ted Hearn, Could TV Stations Lose 
Their Spectrum? MULTICHANNEL  NEWS (June 18, 2001).  Note that the DTTVSS does not rely on TV 
stations “losing their spectrum.”  Note further that cable/DBS penetration will climb above 90 percent in 
about 2004; Japan and Europe are already ahead of the U.S. in the race to 3G wireless; and that the budget 




APPENDIX 1. FULL–POWER U.S. TELEVISION STATIONS BY MARKET 
 




1  New York, NY  22  22 
2  Los Angeles, CA  23  45 
3  Chicago, IL  16  61 
4  Philadelphia, PA  18  79 
5  San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose, CA  22  101 
6  Boston , MA (Manchester,NH)  19  120 
7  Dallas–Ft. Worth, TX  18  138 
8  Washington, DC (Hagerstown, MD)  15  153 
9  Detroit, MI  9  162 
10  Atlanta, GA  13  175 
11  Houston, TX  17  192 
12  Seattle–Tacoma, WA  15  207 
13  Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN  13  220 
14  Tampa–St. Petersburg (Sarasota), FL  14  234 
15  Cleveland, OH  14  248 
16  Miami–Ft. Lauderdale, FL  15  263 
17  Phoenix, AZ  12  275 
18  Denver, CO  16  291 
19  Sacramento–Stockton–Modesto, CA  11  302 
20  Pittsburgh, PA  10  312 
21  Orlando–Daytona Beach–Melbourne, FL  15  327 
22  St. Louis, MO  9  336 
23  Portland, OR  10  346 
24  Baltimore, MD  7  353                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 39 
 
25  San Diego, CA  6  359 
26  Indianapolis, IN  13  372 
27  Hartford & New Haven, CT  9  381 
28  Charlotte, NC  12  393 
29  Raleigh–Durham (Fayetteville), NC  12  405 
30  Kansas City, MO  9  414 
31  Nashville, TN  12  426 
32  Cincinnati, OH  9  435 
33  Milwaukee, WI  12  447 
34  Columbus, OH  7  454 
35  Greenville–Spartanburg, SC–Asheville, NC–
Anderson, SC 
11  465 
36  Salt Lake City, UT  14  479 
37  San Antonio, TX  13  492 
38  Grand Rapids–Kalamazoo–Battle Creek, MI  9  501 
39  Birmingham (Anniston, Tuscaloosa), AL  10  511 
40  Memphis, TN  9  520 
41  Norfolk–Portsmouth–Newport News, VA  8  528 
42  New Orleans, LA  10  538 
43  West Palm Beach–Ft. Pierce, FL  10  548 
44  Buffalo, NY  10  558 
45  Oklahoma City, OK  10  568 
46  Harrisburg–Lancaster–Lebanon–York, PA  7  575 
47  Greensboro–High Point–Winston Salem, NC  9  584 
48  Louisville, KY  10  594 
49  Providence, RI–New Bedford, MA  8  602 
50  Albuquerque–Santa Fe, NM  16  618 
51  Las Vegas, NV  9  627 
52  Wilkes Barre–Scranton, PA  7  634 
53  Jacksonville, FL  10  644                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 40 
 
54  Fresno–Visalia, CA  12  656 
55  Dayton, OH  7  663 
56  Albany–Schenectady–Troy, NY  7  670 
57  Little Rock–Pine Bluff, AR  11  681 
58  Austin, TX  6  687 
59  Tulsa, OK  12  699 
60  Richmond–Petersburg, VA  7  706 
61  Charleston–Huntington, WV  12  718 
62  Mobile, AL–Pensacola (Ft Walton Beach), FL  11  729 
63  Knoxville, TN  9  738 
64  Flint–Saginaw–Bay City, MI  8  746 
65  Wichita–Hutchinson, KS Plus  10  756 
66  Lexington, KY  8  764 
67  Toledo, OH  6  770 
68  Roanoke–Lynchburg, VA  7  777 
69  Green Bay–Appleton, WI  7  784 
70  Des Moines–Ames, IA  7  791 
71  Tucson (Sierra Vista), AZ  8  799 
72  Honolulu, HI  12  811 
73  Paducah, KY–Cape Girardeau, MO–Harrisburg–Mt 
Vernon, IL 
9  820 
74  Rochester, NY  5  825 
75  Omaha, NE  7  832 
76  Shreveport, LA  7  839 
77  Spokane, WA  9  848 
78  Springfield, MO  6  854 
79  Portland–Auburn, ME  8  862 
80  Syracuse, NY  7  869 
81  Ft. Myers–Naples, FL  7  876 
82  Huntsville–Decatur (Florence), AL  8  884                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 41 
 
83  Champaign&Springfield–Decatur, IL  8  892 
84  Madison, WI  6  898 
85  Columbia, SC  7  905 
86  Chattanooga, TN  8  913 
87  South Bend–Elkhart, IN  5  918 
88  Jackson, MS  5  923 
89  Cedar Rapids–Waterloo–Iowa City & Dubuque, IA  7  930 
90  Davenport, IA–Rock Island–Moline, IL  6  936 
91  Burlington, VT –Plattsburgh, NY  8  944 
92  Colorado Springs–Pueblo, CO  5  949 
93  Tri–Cities, TN–VA  7  956 
94  Waco–Temple–Bryan, TX  9  965 
95  Johnstown–Altoona, PA  6  971 
96  Baton Rouge, LA  5  976 
97  Evansville, IN  8  984 
98  El Paso, TX  10  994 
99  Youngstown, OH  4  998 
100  Savannah, GA  7  1005 
101  Lincoln & Hastings–Kearney, NE  6  1011 
102  Harlingen–Weslaco–Brownsville–McAllen, TX  7  1018 
103  Charleston, SC  6  1024 
104  Ft. Wayne, IN  6  1030 
105  Springfield–Holyoke, MA  3  1033 
106  Greenville–New Bern–Washington, NC  8  1041 
107  Lansing, MI  6  1047 
108  Tyler–Longview (Lufkin&Nacogdoches), TX  3  1050 
109  Reno, NV  8  1058 
110  Tallahassee, FL–Thomasville, GA  5  1063 
111  Sioux Falls(Mitchell), SD  8  1071 
112  Peoria–Bloomington, IL  6  1077                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 42 
 
113  Augusta, GA  6  1083 
114  Florence–Myrtle Beach, SC  5  1088 
115  Ft. Smith–Fayetteville–Springdale–Rogers, AR  5  1093 
116  Montgomery (Selma), AL  7  1100 
117  Santa Barbara–Santa Maria–SanLuis Obispo, CA  5  1105 
118  Monterey–Salinas, CA  5  1110 
119  Traverse City–Cadillac, MI  5  1115 
120  Fargo–Valley City, ND  6  1121 
121  Macon, GA  6  1127 
122  Eugene, OR  6  1133 
123  Boise, ID  6  1139 
124  Lafayette, LA  4  1143 
125  Yakima–Pasco–Richland–Kennewick, WA  5  1148 
126  La Crosse–Eau Claire, WI  5  1153 
127  Amarillo, TX  5  1158 
128  Columbus, GA  6  1164 
129  Corpus Christi, TX  5  1169 
130  Bakersfield, CA  4  1173 
131  Columbus–Tupelo–West Point, MS  4  1177 
132  Duluth, MN–Superior, WI  5  1182 
133  Chico–Redding, CA  5  1187 
134  Monroe, LA–El Dorado, AR  6  1193 
135  Rockford, IL  4  1197 
136  Wausau–Rhinelander, WI  5  1202 
137  Beaumont–Port Arthur, TX  4  1206 
138  Topeka, KS  4  1210 
139  Terre Haute, IN  5  1215 
140  Wheeling, WV–Steubenville, OH  3  1218 
141  Medford–Klamath Falls, OR  6  1224 
142  Erie, PA  5  1229                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 43 
 
143  Columbia–Jefferson City, MO  5  1234 
144  Sioux City, IA  6  1240 
145  Joplin, MO–Pittsburg, KS  4  1244 
146  Wichita Falls, TX & Lawton, OK  4  1248 
147  Lubbock, TX  6  1254 
148  Wilmington, NC  4  1258 
149  Bluefield–Beckley–Oak Hill, WV  4  1262 
150  Albany, GA  6  1268 
151  Odessa–Midland, TX  6  1274 
152  Minot–Bismarck–Dickinson(Williston), ND  6  1280 
153  Rochester, MN–Mason City, IA–Austin, MN  6  1286 
154  Anchorage, AK  7  1293 
155  Bangor, ME  5  1298 
156  Binghamton, NY  4  1302 
157  Biloxi–Gulfport, MS  3  1305 
158  Panama City, FL  5  1310 
159  Palm Springs, CA  2  1312 
160  Abilene–Sweetwater, TX  4  1316 
161  Sherman, TX–Ada, OK  2  1318 
162  Salisbury, MD  4  1322 
163  Quincy, IL–Hannibal, MO–Keokuk, IA  4  1326 
164  Idaho Falls–Pocatello, ID  5  1331 
165  Clarksburg–Weston, WV  4  1335 
166  Gainesville, FL  4  1339 
167  Hattiesburg–Laurel, MS  2  1341 
168  Utica, NY  3  1344 
169  Billings, MT  4  1348 
170  Missoula, MT  4  1352 
171  Elmira, NY  3  1355 
172  Dothan, AL  3  1358                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 44 
 
173  Lake Charles, LA  3  1361 
174  Yuma, AZ–El Centro, CA  4  1365 
175  Rapid City, SD  6  1371 
176  Watertown, NY  3  1374 
177  Marquette, MI  4  1378 
178  Alexandria, LA  4  1382 
179  Harrisonburg, VA  3  1385 
180  Jonesboro, AR  3  1388 
181  Bowling Green, KY  4  1392 
182  Greenwood–Greenville, MS  3  1395 
183  Meridian, MS  4  1399 
184  Jackson, TN  3  1402 
185  Parkersburg, WV  1  1403 
186  Grand Junction–Montrose, CO  5  1408 
187  Great Falls, MT  3  1411 
188  Twin Falls, ID  3  1414 
189  Laredo, TX  3  1417 
190  Butte–Bozeman, MT  4  1421 
191  Eureka, CA  5  1426 
192  St. Joseph, MO  2  1428 
193  Charlottesville, VA  2  1430 
194  Lafayette, IN  1  1431 
195  Mankato, MN  1  1432 
196  San Angelo, TX  3  1435 
197  Casper–Riverton, WY  4  1439 
198  Cheyenne, WY–Scottsbluff, NE  4  1443 
199  Ottumwa, IA–Kirksville, MO  2  1445 
200  Bend, OR  2  1447 
201  Lima, OH  3  1450 
202  Zanesville, OH  1  1451                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 45 
 
203  Fairbanks, AK  5  1456 
204  Victoria, TX  2  1458 
205  Presque Isle, ME  2  1460 
206  Juneau, AK  4  1464 
207  Helena, MT  2  1466 
208  Alpena, MI  2  1468 
209  North Platte, NE  3  1471 
210  Glendive, MT  1  1472 
 
Notes & Sources: DMA name and rank from www.nielsenmedia.com/index.html. 
Stations per market from the “Nielsen Station Index, Directory of TV Stations, 2000–
2001” published by Nielsen Media Research. The station count excludes stations 
designated as low–power, satellite, cable, or international.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 46 
 
 
APPENDIX 2. POSTPONEMENTS OF THE 700 MHZ AUCTION 
 
Date scheduled  Date Postponed  Source 
May 10, 2000    Public Notice DA 00–43: “Auction of Licenses in 
the 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands Scheduled 
for May 10, 2000.” Jan. 10, 2000. 
 
May 10, 2000  Mar. 17, 2000  Public Notice DA00–573: “747–762 and 777–792 
MHz Band Auction Postponed until June 7, 2000.” 
Mar. 17, 2000. 
 
June 7, 2000  May 2, 2000  Public Notice DA00–942: “Auction of Licenses for 
the 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands Postponed 
until September 6, 2000.” May 2, 2000. 
 
Sept. 6, 2000  July 31, 2000  Public Notice FCC 00–282: “Auction of Licenses 
for the 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands 
Postponed until March 6, 2001.” July 31, 2000. 
 
Mar. 6, 2001  Jan. 31, 2001  Public Notice DA 01–266: “Auction of Licenses 
for the 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands 
Postponed until September 12, 2001.” Jan. 31, 
2001. 
 
Sept. 12, 2001  July 11, 2001  Public Notice DA 01–1546: “Auction of Licenses 
for the 747–762 and 777–792 MHz Bands (Auction 
# 31) is Postponed.” July 11, 2001 
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APPENDIX 3. RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS NATURAL LOG 
OF  SALES PRICE OF  TV  STATION  (US$). S TATIONS SALES ARE INDIVIDUAL 
TRANSACTIONS 1998–99 (I.E., GROUP SALES EXCLUDED). 
 
Exogenous Variables  (1)  (2) 
















































No. observations  77  77 
R–squared  0.563  0.531 
Notes: Sales price for 1998 converted to 1999 values using CPI Index: 
ftp://ftpbls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.  As the coefficients of log regressions 
are the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to the independent variable, a 
1% change on the No. of TV HHS would increase the sales price of a TV station by 
1.636%. Evaluated at mean values, a 1% change in TVHHs is 5,962 and a 1.6% increase 
on sales price is $776,086. Therefore, the price per additional household = $130.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 48 
 
*= significant @ 99% confidence level; ** = significant @ 95%; *** = significant @ 
90%.  
Sources: For sales price and channel data: Warren Publishing, TV & Cable Factbook 
(2000). For TV HHS:  Designated Market Areas for 1999–2000,  NIELSEN  MEDIA 
RESEARCH  (Nov. 2000),  http://tv.zap2it.com/resources/stations/market_2000.html 
(visited Aug. 8, 2001). For  DMA name and rank: www.nielsenmedia.com/index.html. 
Stations per market:  Nielsen Station Index, Directory of TV Stations, 2000–2001, 
NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH (Nov. 2000). 
 
Descriptive statistics: 
Variable  N  Mean  St Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Price ($ 1999)  77  47,438,000  82,148,000  500,000  520,000,000 
TV HHs   77  596,180  896,190  48,680  6,875,000 
No. Stations  77  8.3  4.5  2  22 
 